they share a number of highly distinctive stylistic and formal traits that mark their difference from other depictions of the war on British television. This article will argue that they represent nothing less than a deliberate and considered attempt to create a new aesthetic strategy for the televisual representation of war that merges the conventions of drama and documentary, and in so doing transforms both those genres in bold, possibly even radical, ways. This article will place this cycle of dramadocumentaries in their various contexts: it will situate the programmes in the history of British drama-documentary, consider the institutional and cultural contexts of their production, analyse their formal and aesthetic strategies and discuss the extent to which they represent a new way of understanding the British historical experience of the Second World
its origins pre-date television and can be traced back to intellectual and aesthetic developments in the British documentary movement during the 1930s. The drama-documentary was the product of particular historical and ideological circumstances and these formative contexts have continued to influence its development ever since.
The orthodox history of British documentary sees the movement fragmenting towards the end of the decade, particularly after John Grierson was ousted as head of the General Post Office (GPO) Film Unit in 1937 (Lovell and Hillier, 1972; Rotha, 1973; Sussex, 1975) . It was Grierson, widely (and appropriately) regarded as the 'father' of the documentary movement, who had laid down its aesthetic and intellectual principles and had the greatest influence on its early history. Following Drfters (1929) , which he produced and directed on behalf of the Empire Marketing Board, Grierson was instrumental in forming a documentary unit first at the Empire Marketing Board, and then from 1933 at the GPO, and in recruiting young filmmakers such as Edgar Anstey, Arthur Elton, Stuart Legg, Paul Rotha and Basil Wright. Grierson's mantra of 'the creative interpretation of actuality' was applied in the early and mid-930s to a series of documentaries such as BBC. The Voice ofBritain (1935) , Coalface (1935) and Night Mail (1936) , characterized by the poetic treatment of their subject matter. In fact, as recent research has demonstrated, the docu-14 mentary movement was riven with differences from the outset and achieved a relatively fragile unity until aMound 1936-7, when it fractured in a decisive manner (Aitken, 1990; Swann, 1989) . Grierson, Rotha and Wright left the GPO Film Unit either to set up independent documentary units (Rotha School (1937) and Elton's Housing Problems (1935) demonstrated a more didactic mode of documentary that focused on social problems and were more obviously political than the work of the GPO Film Unit. The most significant development at the GPO Film Unit in the late 1930s, now under the direction of Brazilian Alberto Cavalcanti, 'was the development of the dramatic documentary film, which was built around stories drawn from actual happenings but then recreated' (Lovell and Hillier, 19 72: 30) . Films such as Harry Watt's The Saving ofBill Blett (1937) and North Sea (1938) marked the emergence of the narrative-documentary or storydocumentary in which real-life events were reconstructed, both on location and in the studio, using non-professional actors who usually had been involved in the events on which the films were based. The aim was to make the documentary film more accessible to a mass audience (which meant making it more attractive to cinema distributors and exhibitors)
by importing some of the narrative codes and conventions familiar from the fictional feature film. (Higson, 1986: 84 (Basil Dearden, 1950) and The Cruel Sea (Charles Frend, 1953) , are properly described perhaps as documentary-drama rather than drama-documentary, as they are based on 'an invented sequence of events and fictional protagonists to illustrate the salient features of real historical occurrences or situations' (Paget, 16 1998: 82). The persistence of the 'wartime wedding' of documentary and the fiction film into the postwar period is most evident in the war films of the 1 950s which reconstructed true stories of the war. The Dam Busters (Michael Anderson, 1955) is often seen as representing the culmination of this trend. The Times remarked: 'All air war films up to this point have been, as it were, working out the fiction-documentary formula ... Here is a full statement, final and complete' (Chapman, 1998b: 69) .
As for the documentary movement itself, most of its practitioners either moved into commercial filmmaking (Watt, Lee, Jackson) or specialized in the production of educational films (Anstey, Rotha, Wright) (Higson, 1986: 93) . The conventional argument is that television adopted the drama-documentary, incorporating it as part of the public service ethos. John Caughie, for example, suggests that 'television, in its dramatized documentaries of the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s, seems to have accepted the form "in good faith" as part of its social responsibility to inform and educate a democratic citizenry' (Caughie, 2000: 104 In general terms, the achievement of the drama documentaries of the 1960s and after is that they built on the specificities of the televisual, on its unique capabilities for the representation of the social real, and introduced a new form to twentieth-century art. They seem to me to have developed an aesthetics of immediacy which was grounded in the technological and historical specificity of television, but was articulated as an achieved form rather than a fact ofnature, exploiting the illusion of the real for political ends ... The creative excitement of these particular drama documentaries lies in the transformation of forms and the complex politics of the everyday which they produce, rather than in the stylistic and generic refinements of later 'quality television'. (Caughie, 2000: 122-3) While alert to the possibility that television drama-documentary might have followed other trajectories, Caughie TWar (1973) . Moreover, the production discourses of the programmes position them between 'drama' and 'documentary'. Alex Holmes, the director of Dunkirk, averred: 'What I wanted to do was use the idiom of an observational documentary but structure the piece as a drama' (Holmes, 2004: 22) . And Richard Dale, director of D-Day, claimed: 'It feels like 1000% drama, but it's also 1000% factual' (Hamilton, 2004: 24) . Dale said that he preferred the term 'factual drama' to 'docu-drama', pointing out that D-Day was not solely a dramatic reconstruction of events but also made use of supposedly 'factual' material: archive footage, contemporary newsreels and oral testimony. 
Institutional and cultural contexts
In the early 21st century the provision of historical programming on television is more extensive than it has ever been. To a large extent this is a consequence of the creation of a multichannel environment with an insatiable demand for 'product' to fill airtime: in this sense, history is a commodity to be marketed alongside gardening, cookery or makeover programmes. It also reflects a popular interest in the past that sustains two mainstream magazines in Britain (History Today and BBC History Magazine) and two dedicated history channels on both cable/satellite and digital terrestrial television (the History Channel and UKTV History). These channels provide a diet of repeats of 'classic' television documentaries (for example, The forld at Tar, Cold TWar and People's Century) alongside a range of other commissioned programmes using a mixture of archive film and dramatic reconstructions (of events for which no archive film exists), with a particular emphasis on military history. To a far greater extent than any of the other mass media, television has become the dominant means 'through which public history was created, sustained and reflected, and through which commercial interests could seek to profit from popular interest in the past' (Black, 2005: 28) .
While most members of the historical profession welcome this public interest in their subject, it is coupled with deep dissatisfaction about the nature and content of much televised history. As David Cannadine recently complained: 'A wholly disproportionate amount of television history is about the twentieth century (and thus about the two world wars and the Nazis)' (Cannadine, 2004: 4 (Smither, 2004: 63-4 ). An advantage of archive film over dramatic reconstruction is that it comes 'ready-made' and only requires editing into a compilation. It also allows programmes to be promoted as being based on 'rare' or 'previously unseen' footage -claims that always must be treated sceptically as only the most prestigious (and more expensively-produced) documentary series such as The Wforld at TWar or People's Century (1996) undertake extensive research in the film archives. Moreover, in very recent times there has been a vogue for colour film of the war -exemplified by The Second Wforld TWar in Colour (1997) and Britain at TWar in Colour (2000) -which 'introduced to the airwaves the concept that a programme had added interest if it sought out colour images of events and periods that were more commonly recalled in black and white' (Smither, 2004: 55) . This was most apparent in the case of D-Day, broadcast in Britain on the 60th anniversary of the Normandy landings. As Richard Dale testifies: 'There was a real imperative at the BBC to make something significant, and a commitment to showing it on 6 June as a single big piece' (Hamilton, 2004: 24) . If the other programmes were linked less directly to specific anniversaries, they can still be seen as part of a wider cultural project to mark the 60th anniversary of the war which also included the BBC's 'People's War' project (a website and a series of national events laid on to collect oral testimony of participants in the war) and a revival of the wartime television drama in series, such as Foyle's WTar (2002-) The production histories of films in the cycle exemplify both the institutional dynamics of the television industry and the economic imperatives that underpin it. While the ITV network has always commissioned most of its programmes from independent producers, this practice did not become the norm at the BBC until the 19DOs, when the introduction of an internal market -in which individual productions were effectively competing for resources -became part of the regime of director-general John Birt. Birt had instigated a tough regime of economic discipline in order to placate a government hostile to the public funding of the BBC through the licence fee, and under attack following the Peacock Report (1986) . During the 1990s and 2000s it became the norm for the BBC to commission programmes from outside producers, effectively bringing it 20 in line with other terrestrial broadcasters and satellite television. There was also an increasing trend towards co-production with overseas partners, reflecting the emergence of a global marketplace for television -or rather, the recognition of a global marketplace that already existed but had become more lucrative in the era of satellite and digital provision, with a proliferation of channels needing programmes to fill airtime (Steemers, 2004) . Co-production with overseas partners is advantageous in two ways:
it allows production costs to be shared and guarantees access to overseas markets. At the same time, however, co-productions also mean that the commercial and ideological needs of partners determine to some extent the content and nature of the final product. These economic and ideological imperatives are best illustrated by the case of D-Day. This was commissioned by the BBC from an independent production company (Dangerous Films), but as a relatively expensive production (costing £3 million) it was necessary to find co-production partners. (Hamilton, 2004: 26 Dunkirk. This was because Jane Root 'wanted to do something very British rather than a co-production' (Holmes, 2004: 22) . It is also the only one in the cycle that focuses exclusively on the British perspective of the war.
Formal and aesthetic strategies These films represent a stylistically coherent production cycle because they employ (albeit to different degrees) techniques that demonstrate 21 consistency between individual films, while at the same time differentiating them as a group from other television history programmes. As well as the mode of dramatic reconstruction (the re-enactment of actual historical events and occurrences), they also import techniques more associated with the documentary mode (particularly the use of archive film and the reliance on personal recollections of the war). It is the combination of these modes that marks the most significant departure from previous representations of the war. Traditionally, the professional discourses of British television documentarists, most famously exemplified by The Wforld at Tar, had distinguished between actuality film and dramatic reconstruction. While the former was seen as 'authentic', the latter was regarded as 'false' or 'inauthentic' and should be avoided wherever possible. Where a documentary does make use of dramatic reconstruction it is the usual practice to identify it as such, either through a caption or in the narration.
Perhaps the most innovative formal feature of these films is that they combine, but do not distinguish between, actuality film and reconstruction. While this practice is anathema to most historians, it does not necessarily represent an intention to deceive the viewer. In fact, the differences between actuality and reconstruction are quite obvious to all but the most untrained eye, not least because the actuality film is mostly in black-andwhite whereas the reconstructed material is in colour. aware of any production that has integrated so systematically the actuality film into its formal system. Another innovation of these films is the incorporation of computergenerated imaging (CGI) into the drama-documentary field. In this respect the films exemplify technological advances in film and television production: one of the reasons the cycle appeared when it did was that it had become technically possible to achieve certain effects. (1) device for the drama-documentary is exemplified in the commentaries for Dunkirk ('All the characters are real, all the events are from first-hand accounts') and D-Day ('These are the true stories of those who lived through D-Day'). WYhen Hitler Invaded Britain represents the fullest integration of oral history into its narrative by using extracts from the diaries and memoirs of participants (including novelist Margery Allingham and Generals Sir Edmund Ironside and Alan Brooke) which are delivered to camera by the actors playing them. Here, significantly, the eyewitness accounts represent views expressed at the time rather than those filtered through hindsight.
In the traditional documentary form, oral history is treated separately from the visual material: the interviewees are usually filmed in a studio and the film extracts rarely demonstrate the specific experiences that they relate, but rather are used for illustrative effect. In these films, oral history is integrated into the drama, not only because the reconstructed incidents are based on personal recollections, but also because the interviewees themselves appear as participants in the narrative. For example, in Dunkirk, each time a new 'character' is introduced, the film includes a photographic shot of the 'real' person alongside the actor playing that person. D-Day and Blitz: London 's Firestorm go further by featuring on-camera shots of participants on or near the locations that are cut into the reconstructions in which those people are played by actors. This device serves to rupture the diegetic world of the drama by switching back and forth between past and present, between reconstruction and actuality. This breaking down of the historical diegesis differentiates these films from feature films such as Saving Private Ryan and locates them within an alternative form of historical representation that Robert A. Rosenstone has labelled 'the New History film'.
The New History film, according to Rosenstone, is one that 'finds the space to contest history, to interrogate either the metanarratives that structure historical knowledge, or smaller historical truths, received notions, conventional images' (Rosenstone 1995: 8) . In contrast to the traditional historical feature film, characterized by linear narrative and the use of familiar archetypes and conventions, the New History film is marked by its unconventional and experimental use of form and technique. It tends to exist outside, or on the margins, of the film and television industries and is usually the preserve of auteur directors with a highly self-conscious formalist style. Examples would include Hiroshima, mon amour (Alain Resnais, 1959) (Rosenstone, 1995: 12) This assumes a relationship between form and content and suggests that formal innovation is a necessary prerequisite for challenging the accepted conventions of historical narratives.
History, myth and memory
One of the characteristics of the New History film is that it tends to be revisionist: it reveals an alternative history that often challenges received ideas about the historical experience. So, for example, Culloden subverts the narrative of romantic Tartanry by characterizing Bonnie Prince Charlie as a drunken coward who flees the field and leaves his supporters to their fate, while Hiroshima, mon amour explores the ambivalent feelings of a French woman who had an affair with a German soldier during the Occupation and thus subverts the Gaullist narrative of national resistance. It is often said that revisionist historians set out deliberately to 'debunk' received history and to challenge the 'myths' of the past. The same can be true of films and television. A correspondent to the Daily Telegraph, for example, claimed that the BBC had set out with the intent 'to expose the myth of Dunkirk' and that the series was 'debunking the myth of the heroic little ships'. This charge -made some two months before the series was broadcast -prompted swift denials from both Alex Holmes and Jane Root. Holmes told the Telegraph: I would like to reassure your readers that this is not the intention of the series, which sets out to reflect the stories of the men who took part in the evacuation.
The film will be a testament to the bravery, sacrifice and heroism of those involved. (Dai/y Telegraph, 2003: 25) Similarly, Root told The Times:
The aim of Dunkirk is to celebrate the veterans' bravery and commemorate those who lost their lives. Dunkirk in no way questions the heroism and sacrifices of those involved in the evacuation. (The Times, 2003: 19) She was even moved to reveal that 'I was born in Leigh-on-Sea, the very place from where the cockle fleet set sail to France' and that she 'grew up hearing stories of these men's extraordinary actions'. For this reason, she averred, she would not condone 'a series that in any way belittled their astonishing achievements' (The Times, 2003: 19) .
The fact that the director and commissioning producer of Dunkirk felt it necessary to deny that the series had set out to 'debunk the myth' demonstrates what a strong hold that myth still exerts on the popular imagination some 64 years after the event itself. There exists a 'popular Dad'sArmy (1968-77) . And it still exerts a strong hold on the public's imagination.
The irony of the controversy that erupted over Dunkirk is that, of all the films in the cycle, it was the one that most closely adhered to the myth. Indeed, to a very large degree the series supports the accepted narrative of Dunkirk as a miracle of logistical improvization in which the British Expeditionary Force was rescued against the odds.7 Most of the elements of the Dunkirk myth that took shape in 1940 -that the debacle was the fault of the French, that the British Army had been let down by its allies, the role of the 'little ships' in the rescue -are present. Even the episode titles -'Retreat', 'Evacuation', 'Deliverance -would seem to endorse the familiar interpretation of events. In paying equal attention to the experiences of the soldiers retreating to the beaches and the civilians who manned the 'little ships', Dunkirk recalls the feature film Dunkirk (Leslie Norman, 1958) , which similarly had endorsed the myth. Perhaps the most challenging aspect of the 2004 Dunkirk is that it demonstrates the ruthlessness of the British in contrast to the ethos of 'muddling through7 exemplified by the 1958 film. Thus Churchill is shown ordering that no wounded men are to be evacuated, and British officers holding the perimeter are seen shooting one of their own colleagues who has disobeyed an order to stand fast. A tension emerges, however, between the actuality film and the reconstruction insofar as it is the reconstructed scenes that dramatize the sheer physical exhaustion of the troops and sailors involved in the evacuation. In the second episode, for example, one soldier is shown to be suffering from shock and another, Private Wilf Saunders, wanders around come to this?' This contrasts sharply with the actuality images of returned members of the British Expeditionary Forces who are invariably smiling and waving at the camera: in one shot a bandaged soldier winks at the camera while munching on a bacon butty. These differences represent, perhaps, the contrast between the 'official' view of 1940 -the actuality shots were in all probability staged for the camera -and the 'unofficial' perspective of participants recalling their individual experiences more than 60 years after the events.
In large measure those who objected to the treatment in Dunkirk complained not that it subverted the myth but rather that it marginalized or ignored certain events at the expense of others. Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, the chief critic, complained that the series had ignored the role of Scottish army regiments in holding the perimeter and focused instead on the (English) Coldstream Guards (Allan, 2004: 11) . This is a familiar complaint made against television. The producers of The Wforld at Tar, for example, received hundreds of complaints for the omission of any mention of a particular ship or regiment.8 One of the problems associated with oral history is the tendency of interviewees to see their own experience as representative of all those involved. Yet, as Holmes realized, 'it was clear from the start that no one character could cover all the facets of the story. We needed multiple perspectives and I was keen to use stories of people who are alive ' (2004: 22) . Dale also recognized the problems inherent in using oral testimony for D-Day:
You soon realise that everyone's war is only 100 yards wide [sic] . When you talk to individuals about their stories, there are huge amounts of disagreement between testimonies. You're very aware of history being a very fluid mix. (Hamilton, 2004: 25) It would be fair to say that filmmakers will instinctively privilege those testimonies that provide the best dramatic material. The more we were hit, the more we had this spirit. I think they thought that they could bomb us into submission, but it did the opposite. The more that was done to us, the more that we responded by being -okay, yeah, we can take it, get on with it. We are not going to submit.
This testimony exemplifies the 'defiance, solidarity and togetherness' that defines the response of Londoners, and the citizens of other British cities, to German bombardment (Connelly, 2004: 129) . To some extent, of course, the interviewees are associating themselves with an accepted narrative that has been presented in countless other accounts of the Blitz, including autobiographical sources and popular histories. However, it is clear from the commentary that the filmmakers were intent on using the Blitz for rather different ideological ends. The persistent theme is the immorality of bombing civilians rather than industrial or military targets and, contrary to the popular narrative, it is suggested that this was a process in which the British themselves participated through bombing raids on Germany during autumn 1940 ('When Munich was fire-bombed, Coventry was the answer'). The film concludes with a didactic voiceover that draws far-reaching conclusions about the nature of the strategic bombing offensive of the war:
The 29th of December 1940 answered a fundamental question of war: ordinary people could endure extraordinary things. The lesson Britain took from that night was that incendiaries and high explosives can breed a firestorm of hurricane levels so long as you return for one final attack. The British replied to the Blitz by bombing many German cities to destruction. In Dresden, as many as 100,000 people were killed in a single night. As in Hamburg and Berlin, the planes returned until the firestorm raged beyond control . . . The people of Germany showed the same resilience as the people of Britain, but the concept of civilians as legitimate targets of war had taken hold. And with it came the technology to succeed. In the face of the atomic bombs on the cities of Japan, resilience was irrelevant. America -the very nation that had appealed for civilians never to be a target of air attack -was the first to truly bomb a population into submission. For the people of London, who had witnessed the start of this spiral of war, the memory proved hard to erase. 29 j/ EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CULTURAL STUDIES 10 (1) On one level this exemplifies the intent of the drama-documentary, ' to provoke debate about the significance of the events' that it depicts.
On another level, it imposes a meaning onto the narrative that is not necessarily supported by the content. To suggest a direct link from the Blitz to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 is highly disingenuous. Historians now accept that the strategic decision to use the atomic bomb had as much to do with an American show of force against the Soviet Union as it represented an attempt to bomb Japan into submission. 
